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EMPOWERING TRIBES-THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT UPHOLDS TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
AIR QUALITY THROUGHOUT RESERVATION LANDS
IN ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
"Territory is the sine qua non of sovereignty"'
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress adopted the Clean Air Act (CAA) 2 in 1963 to combat
the serious decline of the nation's ambient air quality.3 The stated
goal of CAA was to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's
air resources."'4 In 1990, Congress amended the statute to ensure
that Native American nations (Tribes) could participate more fully
in CAA programs.5 As a result of this amendment, tensions
mounted between state and tribal authorities over environmental
issues affecting Native American reservations. 6 Currently, Native
American Tribes are "actively pursuing opportunities to regulate all
1. Judith V. Royster, Environmental Protection and Native American Rights: Con-
trolling Land Use Through Environmental Regulation, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 89
(Summer 1991).
2. See Federal Clean Air Act, [hereinafter CAA] 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
(1988). For a further discussion of CAA, see infra notes 35-44 and accompanying
text.
3. See AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, THE CLEAN AIR ACT PROPOSALS
FOR REVISIONS 2 (1981) [hereinafter AM. ENTERPRISE] (marking origins and pur-
pose of CAA); see also H.R. REP. No. 508 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1260, 1260 (noting seriousness of air pollution and need to improve, strengthen
and accelerate programs for prevention and abatement of air pollution).
4. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 5 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3391
(stating goal of CAA).
5. See id. at 79, 80 (1989), reprinted inA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 8419-20 (discussing purpose of 1990 Amendments as
improving environmental air quality within reservations in manner consistent with
EPA Indian Policy and Federal position supporting tribal self-government as well
as government to government relations between federal and tribal authorities); see
alsoJoshua Epel & Martha Tierney, Tribal Authority Over Air Pollution Sources On and
Off the Reservation, 25 ENVrL. L. REP. 10583, 10587 (Nov. 1995) (noting that "CAA
added [§ 7601 (d) ] which enlarged tribal authority by authorizing EPA to promul-
gate regulations specifying those CAA provisions for which it is appropriate to treat
Native American [T]ribes as States").
6. See id. (1989) (noting increased tensions between state and tribal sovereign-




Reader: Empowering Tribes - The District of Columbia Circuit Upholds Trib
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
296 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL[
environmental media."' 7 Thus, some of the most controversial and
potentially far-reaching environmental developments of the last few
years have derived from tribal sovereign governments located
within the United States.8 Because tribal reservation lands usually
consist of "a jumble of tribal trust lands, Indian allotments, and
non-Indian fee lands," tribal attempts to regulate reservation re-
sources often create jurisdictional disputes between Tribal authori-
ties and individual States.9
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has recognized
tribal primacy over non-member fee lands, generating considerable
controversy.10 The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, for example, departed from common law pre-
cedent and followed EPA's Final Tribal Authority Rule (Final Rule),
holding CAA expressly delegated to Tribes the authority to imple-
ment and enforce air quality regulations.l"
7. William H. Gelles, Tribal Regulatory Authority Under the Clean Air Act, 3
ENvTL. LAW. 363, 365 (Feb. 1997) (acknowledging tribal efforts to regulate all envi-
ronmental arenas, including land, water and air).
8. See id. at 365 (noting recent rise of tribal environmental law issues); see also
Epel & Tierney, supra note 5, at 10584. "The federal government, individual states,
and Native American tribes all assert interests in controlling air pollution on Na-
tive American reservations. The question of which entity should regulate in this
area presents complex issues of federal law, Native American sovereignty, and state
autonomy and sovereignty." Id.
9. Gelles, supra note 7, at 367 (quotingJudith V. Royster, Environmental Protec-
tion and Native American Rights: Controlling Land Use Through Environmental Regula-
tion, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 90 (1991)) (finding jurisdictional conflicts arise
between Tribes issuing environmental regulations pursuant to federal environ-
mental statutes and states presuming they can exercise their jurisdiction over non-
members living on fee lands within reservations). Often, reservation populations
consist of both tribal members and non-members alike. See id. This mix of mem-
bers and non-members co-existing on reservations results from a nineteenth cen-
tury policy of allotment, imposing private land ownership on Tribes. See id.; see also
General Allotment Act, ch. 19, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 331 (1988)). The General Allotment Act divided tribal lands into discrete
parcels. See Gelles, supra note 7, at 367. Under the Act, each household received a
number of acres. See id. The Federal government sold the surplus parcels to white
farmers. See id. As a result, many Native Americans lost their land parcels to estate
tax foreclosure. See id. When the allotment era ended in 1934, tribal lands had
fallen from 140 million acres to 50 million acres. See id.
10. See Epel & Tierney, supra note 5, at 10588; see also B. Kevin Gover &Jana L.
Walker, Tribal Environmental Regulation, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 438, 438 (1989) (ob-
serving that "[a]s [T]ribes have begun developing natural resources and promot-
ing economic development on tribal lands, questions of jurisdictional authority to
administer environmental protection programs within Indian country have
arisen.").
11. See generally Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 211 F.3d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that EPA did not err in finding that CAA delegated
authority to Native American nations to regulate all land within reservations, in-
cluding fee lands owned by non-members). For a further discussion of Arizona
Public, see infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XII: p. 295
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This Note considers the D.C. Circuit case of Arizona Public Ser-
vice Co. v. EPA.' 2 Section II summarizes the facts of Arizona Public.'3
Section III provides a background of CAA and the 1990 Amend-
ments.' 4 Section IV details the D.C. Circuit's holding and rationale,
providing a critical analysis of the court's determination that 42
U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (2) (B) expressly delegates to Tribes the authority
to develop and implement air quality standards under CAA.15 Fi-
nally, section V discusses the impact and future effects of the Ai-
zona Public holding.16
II. FACTS
In 1990, Congress passed a series of amendments to CAA. 7
Specifically, the 1990 Amendments granted EPA authority to treat
Tribes as States for the purpose of implementing air quality regula-
tions under CAA.I8 The 1990 Amendments also directed EPA to
promulgate regulations "specifying those provisions of [CAA] for
which it is appropriate to treat Indian [T]ribes as States."'19
On August 25, 1994, EPA proposed rules to implement the
1990 Amendments. 20 After receiving and responding to public
comments regarding the proposed rules, EPA issued its Final
12. 211 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
13. For a discussion of Arizona Public facts, see infra notes 17-30 and accompa-
nying text.
14. For a discussion of CAA's statutory background, see infra notes 31-82 and
accompanying text.
15. For Narrative and Critical Analyses of the Arizona Public decision, see infra
notes 83-180 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact of the Arizona Public decision upon federal
jurisprudence, see infra notes 181-197 and accompanying text.
17. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399, 2464 (1990) (amending CAA). For a further discussion of the 1990 Amend-
ments, see infra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (1) (A) (1995) (authorizing EPA Administrator to
treat Tribes as States for purpose of regulating air quality under CAA).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (2) (1994). Where EPA "determines the treatment of
Indian [T]ribes as identical to States is inappropriate or administratively infeasi-
ble," EPA is permitted to announce other ways for EPA to administer CAA regula-
tions "so as to achieve the appropriate purpose." 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (4). For a
further discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2), see infra note 52 and accompanying
text.
20. See Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 59 Fed. Reg.
43,956 (proposed Aug. 25, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 35, 49, 50, 81)
[hereinafter Proposed Rule] (announcing EPA's proposed regulations for tribal de-
velopment and implementation of air quality standards under CAA and requesting
public comments regarding proposal). For a further discussion of EPA's Proposed
Rule, see infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
2001]
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Rule. 21 Within the Final Rule, EPA interpreted the 1990 Amend-
ments to constitute a federal grant of authority to Tribes to regulate
air quality on all lands "within the exterior boundaries of the reser-
vation or other areas within the [T] ribe'sjurisdiction."22 According
to EPA, this "territorial approach . . . best advance[d] rational,
sound, air quality management."23 Under the Final Rule, EPA dele-
gated to Tribes the authority to regulate the activities of non-mem-
ber fee owners. 24
On April 10, 1998, Arizona Public Service Company filed a pe-
tition for review of EPA's Final Rule. 25 The Arizona Public Service
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). Title 5 U.S.C. § 553 sets out the administrative
procedure for agency rulemaking. See id. The statute required EPA to post gen-
eral notice of its Proposed Rule by publishing it in the Federal Register. See id. at
§ 553(b). The notice must include: (1) a statement of the time, place and nature
of public rulemaking proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under
which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the Proposed
Rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. See id. at § 553(b) (1), (2),
(3). The statute further required EPA to give interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking process through submission of written data, views or
arguments. See id. at § 553(c); see also Epel & Tierney, supra note 5, at 10587-88
(observing that many States submitted comments to EPA contesting its conclusion
that Supreme Court cases supported inherent tribal jurisdiction over fee lands in
all cases, and predicting that judicial challenges to EPA's tribal regulations are
certain to occur as EPA begins to implement CAA's tribal primacy provisions).
Additionally, the statute required EPA to incorporate the adopted rules into a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose. See5 U.S.C. § 553(c); see also
Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254, 7255
(Feb. 12, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 35, 49, 50, 81) [hereinafter Final
Rule] (setting forth CAA provisions for which it is appropriate to treat Tribes as
states by establishing requirements Tribes must meet if they choose to seek such
treatment and providing for awards of federal financial assistance to Tribes to ad-
dress air quality problems). Finally, the statute ordered EPA to give all interested
persons the right to petition for the issuance, amendment or repeal of its rule. See
5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1994).
22. 42 U.S.C. §7601(d)(2)(B) (1994); see also Arizona Public Serv. Co. v. EPA,
211 F.3d 1280, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (concurring with EPA's interpretation of
1990 CAA Amendments as congressional delegation of authority to regulate air
quality on all lands within reservations).
23. Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7255 (noting both commenters' support for
EPA's interpretation of CAA as express congressional delegation of authority to
Tribes to implement CAA programs over their entire reservation and commenters'
assertion that territorial delegation approach is consistent with federal Indian law
and Congress' intent as expressed in several CAA provisions); see also Gelles, supra
note 7, at 385-86 (hypothesizing that EPA's retention of territorial approach in
Final Rule would render tribal authority to operate CAA programs nearly un-
defeatable by States challenges).
24. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7257 (citing Proposed Rule) (stating "EPA
believes that Tribes generally will have.., authority over air pollution sources on
fee lands.").
25. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1286. Arizona Public filed its petition
against EPA's Proposed Rule pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). For a further discus-
sion of 5 U.S.C. § 553, see supra note 21. The D.C. Circuit consolidated Arizona
4
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Company challenged EPA's grant of regulatory authority, allowing
Tribes to implement and enforce air quality standards over all res-
ervation lands, including privately owned non-member fee lands.26
In its suit against EPA, Arizona Public contended that
"EPA... granted too much authority to Tribes." 27 Specifically, Ari-
zona Public argued against EPA's determination that CAA sec-
tion 7601 (d) (2) (B) expressly delegated to Tribes the authority to
regulate air quality on non-member fee lands.28
The D.C. Circuit held that EPA did not err in finding that CAA
delegated authority to Tribes to regulate all land within reserva-
tions, including non-member fee lands. 29 Thus, the D.C. Circuit
ruled that EPA interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) as an expression of
"congressional intent to grant tribal jurisdiction over non-member
owned fee land within a reservation without the need to determine,
on a case-specific basis, whether a [T]ribe possesse[d] 'inherent
sovereign power.' "3 0
III. BACKGROUND
Like most environmental regulations, Congress enacted CAA
"to protect and enhance human health and environmental integ-
rity. ' 31 CAA is a complex statute, causing unique tensions among
Public's petition with other subsequent petitions into one action. See Arizona Pub-
lic, 211 F.3d at 1286.
26. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1283. Although Arizona Public challenged
EPA's Final Rule on various bases, the question of whether EPA properly inter-
preted CAA to grant Tribes authority to regulate air quality on all land within the
reservation, including non-member fee lands, was the main issue disputed between
the majority and dissenting opinions and is the primary focus of this Note. See id.
For a further discussion of Arizona Public's additional contentions, see infra note
86 and accompanying text.
27. Id. at 1283.
28. See id. at 1286. Among its several challenges to EPA's Final Rule, Arizona
Public primarily asserted that the 1990 Amendments could not be interpreted as
an express delegation of authority to Tribes to regulate privately owned fee lands
located within the exterior boundaries of their reservations. See id.
29. See id. at 1284 (upholding EPA's Final Rule); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1) (requiring petitions for review of regulations promulgated by EPA
Administrator be filed in United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia). Under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1):
A petition for review of action of [EPA] Administrator [ promulgating
any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard... or any
other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action
taken, by the Administrator under [CAA] may be filed only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Id. (emphasis added).
30. Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1288.
31. Julie M. Reding, Comment, Controlling Blue Skies in Indian Country: Who Is
the Air Quality Posse - Tribes or States? The Applicability of the Clean Air Act in Indian
2001]
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tribal nations, individual states and the federal government.3 2 In
recent years, various federal court decisions have heightened ten-
sions between Tribes and States, debating the scope of tribal regula-
tory authority under CAA.33 Congressional revisions of CAA,
therefore, have attempted to balance the competing demands and
countervailing interests of both Tribes and state leaders.3 4
A. Development of CAA
In the early 1960s, Congress attempted to reduce the adverse
effects of air pollutants by enacting CAA.35 In subsequent years,
Congress amended the statute several times.3 6 The Air Quality
County and on Oklahoma Tribal Lands, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 161, 161 (Spring
1993) (relating purposes of 1990 CAA Amendments); see also 42 U.S.C. 7401(c)
(revealing one purpose of CAA is to protect and enhance national air quality as to
promote public health and welfare).
32. See AM. ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 2; see also Reding, supra note 31, at 161
(1993) (observing when issue of controlling pollution on reservations arises,
Tribes, individual States and federal government all assert governing interests).
33. See Royster, supra note 1, at 90 (finding that "[a]lthough Tribal govern-
mental authority over Indians on Indian lands is unquestioned," issue of tribal
regulatory authority over non-member fee lands remains unsettled); see generally
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (asserting general rule that Tribes
do not have inherent sovereign authority over non-members of Tribe within its
reservation); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (maintaining that Tribes lack requisite authority to
zone privately owned non-member fee land within reservation); South Dakota v.
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (holding that Tribes may not regulate non-member
fee lands absent express congressional delegation).
34. See AM. ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 1 (noting the serious debate surround-
ing revision of original CAA); see also David F. Coursen, Tribes as States: Indian Tribal
Authority to Regulate and Enforce Federal Environmental Laws and Regulations, 23
ENVTL. L. REP. 10579, 10579 (Oct. 1993) (stating "federal environmental laws put
the federal government in a leadership role in environmental management, but
preserve the concepts of state primacy and tribal sovereignty."). For a further dis-
cussion of jurisdictional conflicts and countervailing state and tribal interests, see
supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
35. See AM. ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 2 (characterizing original "barebones
approach to cleaning up nation's air."). Congress enacted CAA in 1963. See id.
Among other provisions, CAA, as originally enacted, authorized the Secretary of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") to hold abatement
conferences in order to deal with interstate and intrastate air pollution. See id.
(citing Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988))). Where these conferences proved unsuccess-
ful, the Secretary was authorized to file suits to abate serious pollution. See AM.
ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 2. Finally, the 1963 CAA authorized research on spe-
cific problems of air pollution and required the Secretary to publish research find-
ings on the effects of air pollution. See id.
36. See id. In 1965, Congress amended CAA, establishing national emission
standards for automobile engines. See id. (citing Act of Oct. 20, 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)). Sub-
sequently, the 1966 Amendments authorized funding for state air pollution con-
6
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Control Act of 1967 (AQCA) 37, an early CAA amendment, shifted
the focus of CAA and required the Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare to designate air quality control re-
gions and set air quality standards .3  Additionally, AQCA required
States to prepare implementation plans revealing their proposals to
achieve the set standards. 39 Though CAA's earliest revisions shaped
the evolution of CAA, the 1970 Amendments established the regu-
latory framework for air quality control that exists today.40 Building
trol plans. See Am. ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 2 (citing Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat.
954 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-71 (1981)).
37. See Am. ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 2 (citing Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat.
485 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1871 (1988)).
38. SeeAm. ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 2; see also Reding, supra note 31, at 163
(reporting when Congress realized substantial threat posed by stationary sources of
air pollution, it sought regulation of point sources through AQCA). While AQCA
reiterated CAA promise that primary responsibility for prevention and control of
air pollution remained with States and local governments, the statute functionally
increased the federal government's role in regulating air quality by according fed-
eral authorities certain powers of supervision and enforcement. See id.; see also AM.
ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 2 (revealing that where States failed to adopt air qual-
ity standards for control regions, Secretary of HEW could set such standards by
regulation).
39. See id. (charting evolution of States' role in achieving set air quality
standards).
40. See id. "By 1970, states had made little progress in reaching the prescribed
federal air quality standards." Reding, supra note 31, at 163. The 1970 Amend-
ments therefore supplanted state standards and added provisions for the promul-
gation of nationally uniform primary and secondary air quality standards. See AM.
ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 2. Under the 1970 Amendments, EPA formulated
national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") to protect the public from
targeted air pollutants. See Reding, supra note 31, at 164. NAAQS are defined as
"air emission standards deemed acceptable by Congress." AM. ENTERPRISE, supra
note 3, at 2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)). The 1970 Amend-
ments also incorporated the idea of "attainment" into CAA. See Reding, supra note
31, at 164. An "attainment" area is a "designated area which has attained specific
emission standard." AM. ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 2-3 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 7501 (a) (1988 & Supp. I 1990)). Additionally, the 1970 Amendments required
EPA to publish proposed regulations describing NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)
(1995). After a ninety day period, EPA was instructed to promulgate the proposed
NAAQS through regulations. See id. Within [three years], the federal government
required States to submit proposals outlining their individual plans for the imple-
mentation and maintenance of NAAQS within state boundaries. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(1) (1995). Under the 1970 Amendments, state implementation plans
[hereinafter SIPs] affecting each air quality region became subject to federal ap-
proval. See AM. ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 3. If a SIP failed to meet federal ap-
proval, the federal government would substitute its own plan for implementation
and maintenance of NAAQS within state borders. See Reding, supra note 31, at
164-65.
Notably, the 1970 CAA Amendments also marked the birth of EPA. See AM.
ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 3. President Richard Nixon's 1970 Reorganization Act
created EPA, making the EPA Administrator responsible for executing federal re-
sponsibilities. See id. (citing Reorganization Plan. No. 3).
20011
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upon that framework, Congress again amended CAA in 1977.41
While the 1977 Amendments authorized Tribes to "redesignate"
their reservations for the purpose of preventing significant deterio-
ration, the amendments failed to address whether Tribes had the
authority to implement and enforce air quality regulations over res-
ervation lands. 42 Though the 1977 Amendments did little to
strengthen tribal regulatory authority over reservation air quality,
the amendments represented an important step toward tribal rec-
ognition and self-government in the environmental arena. 43
B. 1990 CAA Amendments
In 1990, Congress again amended CAA to ensure that Tribes
participated more fully in planning, implementing and enforcing
41. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95 Stat. 685 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1995)); see also Gelles, supra note 7, at
374 (noting that Congress first recognized Tribes in 1977 CAA Amendments).
The 1977 CAA Amendments restricted state discretion in several ways. See Am.
ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 3. The 1977 Amendments added new provisions to
CAA in order to prevent the significant deterioration of air quality in areas already
meeting NAAQS. See id. These amendments called for the protection of visibility
in certain national parks and other federal areas from impairment by man-made
pollutants. See id. Under the 1977 Amendments, CAA divided air control regions
into three categories, specifying the maximum allowable pollution increases for
each category. See id. Class I is characterized as the most stringent standard, pro-
tecting pristine air quality by permitting very little air quality deterioration. See
Reding, supra note 31, at 165. While Class II permits some deterioration, Class III
is considered the least stringent standard, allowing air quality deterioration to the
NAAQS level. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (e)(3) (1996)
In addition to requiring that states devise plans to prevent significant deterio-
ration of air quality within control regions, the 1977 Amendments also allowed
Tribes to "redesignate" reservation lands under the Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration Plan [hereinafter PSD]. See also AM. ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 3. The
1977 CAA Amendments approved EPA's practice of allowing Tribes to redesignate
their reservations from Class II to Class I lands. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (c)
(1975)). Interestingly, no CAA provision recognized Tribes prior to 1977. See Red-
ing, supra note 31, at 166.
42. See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 79 (1989), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORy OF
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 8419 (noting that while Congress
amended CAA in 1977 to authorize Tribes to redesignate their reservations for
prevention of significant deterioration, it failed to address tribal authority regard-
ing air quality planning or enforcement in amendments); see also Reding, supra
note 31, at 162 (revealing Congress neglected to address issue of who was vested
with authority to enforce air quality standards in 1977 Amendments); Gelles, supra
note 7, at 376 (stating that ability to redesignate lands did not considerably
strengthen tribal authority).
43. See id. (noting inherent weakness and marginal strengths in 1977 Amend-
ments); see also Reding, supra note 31, at 161-62 (observing that until 1990 Amend-
ments, it was unclear whether Tribes or States had jurisdictional authority to
address air quality protection problems on tribal lands).
8
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CAA programs. 44 The Senate Report indicated that the 1990
Amendments were "intended to provide Indian [T]ribes the same
opportunity to assume primary planning, implementation and en-
forcement responsibilities for [CAA] programs . . . as they [were]
presently accorded under the Safe Drinking Water Act ('SDWA') 45
and the Clean Water Act ('CWA') 4 6 . ' ' 4 7 SDWA and CWA delegated
to Tribes the authority to administer and enforce their respective
environmental programs within the reservation. 48 EPA thus deter-
44. See Arnold W. Reitza, JR., AIR POLLUTION LAW § 6-2(d) (1995) (noting that
Congress enacted 1990 Amendments to ensure Tribes enjoyed same regulatory
privileges under CAA as they did under SDWA and CWA); see also S. REP. No. 101-
228, supra note 42, at 8419 (maintaining that 1990 amendments are "necessary to
ensure that [T] ribes will be allowed to participate fully in programs established by
[CAA] as they take affirmative measures to manage, regulate and protect air
quality.").
45. See Federal Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (b) (1991 & Supp.
2000). SDWA authorizes the EPA Administrator to treat Tribes as States for SDWA
regulatory purposes. See id. at § 300j-11 (a) (1). SDWA also permits the Administra-
tor to delegate to Tribes primary enforcement responsibility for public water sys-
tems as well as underground injection control and provides approved Tribes with
either grants or contract assistance to carry out SDWA regulatory programs. See id.
at § 300j-11 (b) (1991 & Supp. 2000). SDWA authorizes Tribes' treatment as States
provided:
(A) the Indian tribe is recognized by the Secretary of the Interior and
has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental duties
and powers;
(B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe are within the area
of the Tribal government's jurisdiction;
(C) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Admin-
istrator's judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a
manner consistent with the terms and purposes of [SDWA] and of
all applicable regulations.
Id. at § 300j-1 I(b) (1) (A), (B), (C).
46. See Federal Clean Water Act, [hereinafter CWA] 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)
(Supp. 2000). CWA authorizes the EPA Administrator to treat Tribes as States for
CWA regulatory purposes provided:
(1) the Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial gov-
ernmental duties and powers;
(2) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the man-
agement and protection of water resources which are held by an In-
dian tribe, held by the United States in trust for Indians, held by a
member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a
trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an
Indian reservation; and
(3) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Adminis-
trator's judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a
manner consistent with the terms and purposes of [SDWA] and of all
applicable regulations.
33 U.S.C. § 1377(e).
47. S. REP. No. 101-228, supra note 42, at 8419.
48. See Reding, supra note 31, at 167 (reporting that SDWA and CWA con-
rained express congressional delegations); see also Royster, supra note 1, at 94 (re-
vealing that amendments to SDWA, CWA and CAA generally provide for treating
Tribes as states for most or all of programs authorized by acts); Beverly Conerton,
2001] 303
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mined that the process for treating Tribes as States under SDWA
and CWA applied to all regulatory programs available under the
acts. 49 In 1986, EPA determined that the purpose of the 1986
SDWA Amendments was to allow eligible Tribes an opportunity to
participate in its regulatory programs. 50 In 1991, EPA followed its
SDWA rationale, finding that Congress also expressed a preference
for tribal regulation of surface water quality on Indian
reservations.5'
Essentially, the 1990 CAA Amendments require EPA to pro-
mulgate regulations, specifying CAA provisions for which it is ap-
propriate to treat Tribes in the same manner as States. 52 The 1990
Amendments require Tribes seeking treatment as States to submit
an application for consideration to EPA.5 3 A Tribe's treatment as a
State, however, remains contingent upon the Tribe's satisfying cer-
tain statutory requirements. 54 If, after review, EPA determines that
Tribal "Treatment as a State" Under Federal Environmental Laws, NAT'L ASS'N OF Arr'vs
GEN.: NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENTJ. 3 (Nov. 1997) (maintaining that "[i]n making
decisions whether to grant program authorization to Tribes, EPA has interpreted
[SDWA, CWA and CAA] with an assumption that Congress expressed a preference
for tribal regulation on Indian reservations.").
49. See Reding, supra note 31, at 167 (noting that EPA modified SDWA's and
CWA's treatment as states processes in 1994, applying processes to all regulatory
programs under acts); see also Royster, supra note 1, at 94 (holding that
"[a]mendments to SDWA, CWA in 1987 and CAA in 1990 generally provide for
treating [T] ribes as States for most or all of the programs authorized by the acts").
50. See generally Conerton, supra note 47 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 37,396, 37,408
(1988)).
51. See id. (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,878-79 (1991)).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (2) (1995). Title 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (2) provides,
"The Administrator shall promulgate regulations... specifying those provisions of
this chapter for which it is appropriate to treat Indian tribes as States." Id.; see also
Epel & Tierney, supra note 5, at 10584 (characterizing 1990 Amendments as -re-
quiring EPA to issue regulations that govern tribal air quality management).
53. See Coursen, supra note 34, at 10582-83 (revealing that Tribes which sub-
mit applications to EPA and gain approval for treatment as States are eligible for
program approval and subsequent grants provided that Tribes meet applicable
requirements).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d)(2). CAA authorizes the EPA Administrator to
treat Tribes as states for CAA regulatory purposes provided:
(A) the Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial gov-
ernmental duties and powers;
(B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the man-
agement and protection of air resources within the exterior bounda-
ries of the reservation or other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction;
and
(C) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the judg-
ment of the Administrator, of carrying out the functions to be exer-
cised in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of this
chapter and all applicable regulations.
Id. at § 7601 (d) (2) (A), (B), (C).
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a Tribe satisfies the statutory requirements for treatment as a State,
the Tribe becomes eligible to seek applicable EPA grants and pro-
gram approvals.55 Additionally, the 1990 CAA Amendments au-
thorize the EPA Administrator to develop regulations establishing
the required elements of tribal implementation plans (TIPs). 56 In
general terms, TIPs are the "tribal analogue of state implementa-
tion plans."5
7
C. EPA's Proposed Rule
In accordance with the above-mentioned statutory require-
ment that the EPA Administrator promulgate regulations regarding
Tribes' treatment as States, EPA published the Proposed Tribal Au-
thority Rule (Proposed Rule) on August 25, 1994.58 In its Proposed
Rule, EPA announced its finding that the 1990 CAA Amendments
"grant[ed], to Tribes approved by EPA. .. [the] authority [to en-
force CAA programs] over all air resources within the exterior
55. See Coursen, supra note 34, at 106 (observing that once Tribe meets regu-
latory requirements and obtains EPA approval for treatment as State, that Tribe
becomes subject to state duties and privileges in its application for program
responsibility).
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d)(3). Title 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(3) provides: "The
Administrator may promulgate regulations which establish the elements of tribal
implementation plans and procedures for approval or disapproval of tribal imple-
mentation plans and portions thereof." Id.
The 1990 CAA Amendments allow the EPA Administrator broad discretion in
determining TIP criteria. See Reding, supra note 31, at 167 n.53 (noting that 42
U.S.C. § 7601(d) (3) reserves much administrative authority to EPA Administra-
tor). Section 7601(d) (3) empowers EPA Administrator to promulgate regulations,
establishing the elements of TIPs and procedures for approval distinct from and in
addition to SIP regulations. See id. The foundational requirements for treating
Tribes as States thus set a higher bar for TIPs than SIPs. See id. For a further
discussion of SIPs, see supra note 40.
57. See Gelles, supra note 7, at 381 (finding that "[b]ecause of specific lan-
guage added to CAA [§ 7410(o)], Tribes regulate . . .air resources through the
tribal analogue of state implementation plans"). Title 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o)
provides:
If an Indian tribe submits an implementation plan to the Administrator
pursuant to [§] 7601 (d) ... the plan shall be reviewed in accordance with
the provisions for review set forth ... for State plans, except as otherwise
provided by regulation promulgated under [§] 7601 (d) .. .the plan shall
become applicable to all areas (except as provided otherwise in the plan)
located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, notwithstand-
ing the issuance of any patent and including rights-of-way running
through the reservation.
Id. For a further discussion of SIPs, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
58. See generally Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,956 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 35, 49, 50 and 80) (August 25, 1994) (setting forth proposed CAA provisions
for which it is appropriate to treat Tribes in same manner as States, establishing
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boundaries of a reservation." 59 In developing the Proposed Rule,
EPA acted in compliance with the principles set forth in both the
existing Federal Indian Policy and EPA's Indian Policy.60 Under its
Indian policy, EPA vowed "to give special consideration to [t]ribal
interests in making Agency policy, and to ensure the close involve-
ment of [t]ribal [g]overnments in making decisions and managing
environmental programs affecting reservation lands." 61
Upon these bases, EPA determined that the 1990 CAA Amend-
ments expressly delegated to Tribes federal authority to implement
and enforce air quality standards over reservation lands.62 EPA fur-
ther noted that Congress' grant of authority permitted Tribes "to
address conduct on all lands, including [non-member] owned fee
lands, within the exterior boundaries of a reservation. '63 EPA thus
59. See id. at 43,958 (emphasis added) (stating § 7601 (d) required EPA to
promulgate regulations that provide for Tribes' assumption of responsibility for
development and implementation of CAA programs on lands within exterior
boundaries of reservations or other areas within their jurisdiction); see also Gelles,
supra note 7, at 383 (noting that finding congressional delegation of authority to
Tribes would allow Tribes to address conduct on all lands within exterior bounda-
ries of reservation, including non-Indian fee lands).
60. See Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,956. On January 24, 1983, President
Ronald Reagan issued the Federal Indian Policy. See President's Indian Policy
Statement, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 98 (]an. 28, 1983). Building upon the
federal format, EPA created its own Indian Policy. See EPA Policy for the Adminis-
tration of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984) (cited in
Coursen, supra note 34, at 10588); see also Reding, supra note 31, at 171-72. The
thrust of the Indian Policy stressed the Federal Government's commitment to tri-
bal self-determination and committed the Federal Government to work directly
with Tribal Governments on a government-to-government basis. See id.; see also
Coursen, supra note 34, at 10588 (quoting EPA's Policy for Administration of Envi-
ronmental Programs on Indian Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984)).
61. Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,957 (quoting EPA Policy for Administra-
tion of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984)). Under
its Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian Reserva-
tions, EPA, under the principles of the Federal Indian Policy, committed itself to
recognizing Tribal Governments "as sovereign entities with primary authority over
and responsibility for the reservation populace." Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at
43,957. EPA further announced that it would "work directly with Tribal Govern-
ments as the independent authority for reservation affairs." Id. Under its Indian
Policy, EPA committed itself to "encourage and assist [T] ribes in assuming regula-
tory and program management responsibilities for reservation lands." Gelles,
supra note 7, at 365 (quoting Policy for Administration of Environmental Programs
on Indian Reservations, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Nov. 8, 1984)).
Under EPA's Indian Policy, EPA provides technical and financial assistance to
Tribes interested in developing programs and assuming regulatory management
over their reservations. See B. Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Tribal Environmental
Regulation, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 438, 443 (Nov. 1989).
62. See Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,958 (proposing that 1990 CAA
Amendments constituted express congressional delegation to Tribes to regulate
air quality over reservation lands).
63. Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,958 (noting that proposed EPA interpre-
tation related to potential scope of regulatory jurisdiction approved Tribes held
12
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took the position that Tribes "are the optimal governments to con-
trol and manage reservation lands and resources."64
Following the publication of EPA's Proposed Rule, several
commentators argued that EPA's rule conflicted with existing com-
mon law.65 Prior to the 1990 Amendments, the United States Su-
preme Court in Montana v. United States'6 noted that Tribes retain
only inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate
domestic relations among members, to prescribe rules of inheri-
tance for members and to punish tribal offenders.i 7 In Montana,
the Supreme Court adhered to its decision in United States v.
Wheeler, 68 finding that "[t] he areas in which .. .implicit divestiture
of [tribal] sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those
involving the relations between an Indian [T]ribe and non-mem-
bers of the [T] ribe."' 69 While Montana generally supported the pro-
position that Tribes' inherent authority does not encompass the
activities of non-members on fee lands within reservations, the
Court maintained that a Tribe does "retain inherent power to exer-
cise civil authority over the conduct of [non-members] on fee lands
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some di-
rect effect on the political integrity, the economic security or the
pursuant to 1990 Amendments); see also Steffani A. Cochran, Treating Tribes as
States Under the Federal Clean Air Act: Congressional Grant of Authority - Federal Preemp-
tion - Inherent Authority, 25 N.M. L. Rv. 323, 333 (Spring 1996) (stating "[i]f a
[T] ribe plans to regulate the activities of non-members on non-member fee lands,
even if it does not meet the [Montana] test . . . it may still obtain the authority
through congressional delegation.").
64. Royster, supra note 1, at 91 (finding that despite practical principles of
tribal sovereignty, federal plenary power and state jurisdictional assertions compli-
cate land related issues within reservation).
65. See Epel & Tierney, supra note 5, at 10584 (hypothesizing "if EPA's pro-
posed rule becomes final questions will undoubtedly arise as to how courts will
interpret the rule [given] its arguable conflict with Brendale and Bourland"); see also
Gelles, supra note 7, at 365-66 (noting that "[t]ribal authority to regulate the reser-
vation environment create[d] considerable anxiety in surrounding States.").
66. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
67. See id. at 564 (finding that Tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with
their diminished status as sovereigns); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 323 (1978) (noting that Tribes have power to determine tribal membership,
to regulate domestic relations among Tribe members and to prescribe rules for
inheritance of property unless otherwise limited by treaty or statute).
68. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
69. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (finding that limitations
on tribal exercise of power is consistent with dependent status of Tribes); see also
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326 (observing that areas in which Tribes have been divested of
sovereignty are those areas involving relations between Tribes and non-members);
see generally Felix Cohen, FEDERAL INDAN LAW HANDBOOK 231 (1982) (noting that
Tribes retain their sovereignty until Congress acts to divest that sovereignty).
2001]
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health or welfare of the [T] ribe."70 Montana thus established a gen-
eral test for determining tribal civil jurisdiction over non-member
fee lands within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. 7'
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation,72 the Supreme Court further restricted tribal regulatory
rights, granting county governments significant zoning power over
reservation lands. 73 The Brendale Court based its decision upon an
analysis of the land's "essential character. '74 While the Brendale de-
cision, in effect, established a checkerboard pattern ofjurisdiction
within Indian reservations, it also affected principles of tribal sover-
eignty. 75 Most recently, in South Dakota v. Bourland,76 the Supreme
70. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (carving out exception to general proposition
that Tribes lack jurisdiction over non-member fee lands within reservation). Fee
lands are "lands that lie within the boundaries of a reservation ...that private
entities own in fee." Epel & Tierney, supra note 5, at 69.
71. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (illustrating test to determine tribal juris-
diction over non-member fee lands within exterior boundaries of reservation); see
also Gelles, supra note 7, at 369 (noting that Montana announced general rule that
Tribes lack inherent jurisdiction over non-member fee lands). For a further dis-
cussion of the Montana test, see infra note 99 and accompanying text.
72. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
73. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 428 (1989) (White, J., plurality) (stating that Tribes lacked authority to
zone fee lands owned by non-members). The Brendale Court significantly reduced
Tribes' ability to regulate and control lands within tribal territories. See id.; see also
Royster, supra note 1, at 92. Ultimately, the Brendale plurality determined,
"[w] here all or part of an Indian reservation has significant non-Indian ownership,
the state or county has land use control over all non-Indian land." Id. According
to Montana and Brendale, Tribes lose any former rights of absolute, exclusive use
and occupation over fee lands conveyed to non-members. See South Dakota v. Bour-
land, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993). In order for a Tribe to exercise its regulatory pow-
ers over fee lands under the Brendale decision, non-member activities "must be
demonstrably serious and must imperil the political integrity, economic security or
the health and welfare of the tribe." Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431.
74. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 447 (Stevens, J. concurring in part) (stating "line-
drawing is inherent in the continuum that exists between those reservations that
still maintain their status as distinct social structures and those that have become
integrated in other local polities."). The Brendale plurality opinion, written by
White, held that the primary issue before the Court was whether and to what ex-
tent a Tribe had a "protectable interest" in the disputed lands. See generally
Conerton, supra note 48, at 3. According to the Brendale Court, a region largely
occupied by non-members loses its "Indian" character and becomes "an integrated
portion of the county [in which it sits]." See Royster, supra note 1, at 93 (quoting
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 446). Through this type of analysis, the Supreme Court cre-
ated a case by case approach to questions of tribal regulatory authority over non-
member fee lands. See Cochran, supra note 63, at 336.
75. See Royster, supra note 1, at 92 (noting that States' regulation of non-mem-
ber lands within reservations created tribal territories with checkerboard land own-
ership). "Checkerboard jurisdiction . . .discourages long-range planning, hinders
comprehensive resource management, and breeds conflict and distrust." Id. at 91.
76. 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (concluding that Congress clearly abrogated Tribes'
pre-existing regulatory control over non-Indian hunting and fishing).
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Court followed the Montana and Brendale rationales, holding tribal
regulatory authority over non-member fee lands cannot exist with-
out Congress' express delegation. 7 7 While these cases did not ad-
dress CAA particularly, opponents to the Proposed and Final Tribal
Authority Rules nonetheless cite them to bolster their arguments
against EPA's Final Rule. 78
D. EPA's Final Rule
Despite opposition, EPA found that CAA constituted a statu-
tory grant ofjurisdictional authority to Tribes over non-member fee
lands. 79 In its Final Rule, EPA argued that the language and legisla-
tive history of the 1990 CAA Amendments were consistent with a
finding that the statute expressly delegated to Tribes the authority
to implement and enforce air quality standards. 80 EPA rooted its
interpretation of the 1990 Amendments in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.8 1 Despite the lack of common law pre-
cedent from which to draw a clear conclusion, EPA ultimately inter-
77. See id. at 694-95 (finding no evidence that Congress intended to allow
Tribes power to assert regulatory jurisdiction over disputed lands pursuant to their
inherent sovereignty or congressional delegation); see also Coursen, supra note 34,
at 10586.
78. See generally Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7254-7257 (Feb. 12, 1998) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 35, 49, 50, 81).
79. See id. at 7254 (observing that "[i]t is a settled point of law that Congress
may, by statute, expressly delegate federal authority to a [T]ribe."); see also Cour-
sen, supra note 34, at 109 (upholding that "Congress has broad authority over tri-
bal affairs and may by statute delegate federal authority to a [T]ribe."). EPA thus
based its Final Rule on the principle that "Congress has plenary power over Tribes
that it can exercise either to enhance or to diminish tribal sovereignty." Gelles,
supra note 7, at 368.
80. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7258 (revealing "EPA's interpretation of
CAA is based on the language, structure, and intent of the statute"); see also Gelles,
supra note 7, at 384 n. 141 (stating that "legislative history of CAA supports EPA
delegation interpretation."). EPA believed that Congress, in CAA, chose to adopt
a "territorial approach" to the protection of air resources within reservations. See
id. at 383-84. EPA expected its delegation approach to effectively minimize juris-
dictional entanglements and checkerboarding within reservations. See id. at 383-
85.
81. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron Court established a two part test for
reviewing Agency interpretations of Agency administered statutes. See id. at 842.
First, the court considers whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue. See id. If Congress has specifically addressed the issue in question,
the reviewing court must follow Congress' intent. See id. at 842-43. Where congres-
sional intent is ambiguous, a reviewing court must determine whether the agency's
statutory interpretation is reasonable. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1287. Thus, a
court reviewing an Agency's interpretation of a statute need only consider whether
the agency reasonably filled the gap Congress left in the statute. See id.
2001]
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preted the 1990 Amendments as expressly delegating to Tribes




The D.C. Circuit, in Arizona Public, began its analysis of peti-
tioner's claim by reviewing the statutory background of CAA.8 3 Ex-
amining the effects of the 1990 Amendments, the Arizona Public
court noted that the 1990 Amendments added specific language to
CAA, granting EPA the authority to treat Tribes as States for the
purpose of regulating air quality on reservation lands. 84 The D.C.
Circuit in Arizona Public also observed that under the 1990 Amend-
ments, EPA was to promulgate regulations outlining those provi-
sions of CAA for which it was appropriate to treat Tribes as States.85
The D.C. Circuit thus weighed the petitioner's several challenges to
EPA's Final Rule against the directives of the 1990 Amendments. 86
82. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254; see also Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1290
(noting that only few cases previously addressed and upheld express congressional
delegation to Tribes generally); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57
(1975) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 1161 was express delegation to Tribes of au-
thority to regulate alcohol transactions); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 728-29
(1983) (reaffirming Mazurie).
83. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1284 (characterizing CAA as establishing
"framework for a federal-state partnership to regulate air quality."). Ultimately,
the D.C. Circuit interpreted the 1990 Amendments as Congress' attempt to in-
crease the role of Tribes in that partnership. See id.
84. See id. at 1285 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (1) (A) (1995) (reporting that
CAA authorized EPA Administrator to treat Indian tribes as States)); see also supra
note 18 and accompanying text.
85. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1285 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (2)). For
a further discussion of § 7601(d) (2), see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
86. See id. at 1286. In addition to Arizona Public's primary contention that
EPA's interpretation of the 1990 Amendments as an express delegation of author-
ity to Tribes to regulate non-member fee lands within a reservation is incorrect,
Arizona Public raised several other challenges to EPA's Final Rule. See id. Arizona
Public argued that EPA impermissibly interpreted "reservation" to include lands
held in trust and Pueblos. See id. Arizona Public also contended that EPA wrongly
interpreted CAA to permit Tribes to issue tribal implementation plans ("TIPs")
and redesignations for land outside reservation boundaries. See id. Additionally,
Arizona Public asserted that EPA failed to allow comment on tribal applications to
issue regulations under CAA. See id. Arizona Public further alleged that EPA's
interpretation of the 1990 Amendments effectively abrogated preexisting agree-
ments between Tribes and regulated industry. See id. Finally, Arizona Public con-
tended that EPA's Final Rule regarding judicial review procedures for Title V
programs rested on an impermissible interpretation of CAA and that EPA promul-
gated its Final Rule regarding such procedures with insufficient notice to affected
parties. See id. The D.C. Circuit ultimately found Arizona Public's challenges to
EPA's Final Rule "mostly meritless." See id. at 1284. In addition to its determina-
16
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In analyzing EPA's interpretation of CAA, the majority first
turned to Chevron.8 7 In Arizona Public, the majority found that Chev-
ron stood for the principle that "where congressional intent is am-
biguous, ... an agency's interpretation of a statute entrusted to its
administration is entitled to deference, so long as it is reasona-
ble."8 8 The D.C. Circuit noted that its primary concern under the
Chevron analysis was to ensure that EPA acted within the bounds of
congressional delegation.8 9 Employing the Chevron analysis, the Ari-
zona Public court observed that a reviewing court must first exhaust
the traditional tools of statutory construction to determine whether
an act admits a plain meaning.9 0
Turning its attention to petitioner's principal argument, the
majority analyzed whether EPA misconstrued the 1990 Amend-
ments to CAA as an express congressional delegation which author-
ized Tribes to regulate air quality over non-member fee lands
within reservations.9 1 The court stated that it is an undisputed fact
tion that EPA did not err in finding CAA delegated authority to Tribes to regulate
member lands as well as non-member fee lands within reservations, the Arizona
Public court upheld EPA's construction of "reservation" to include trust lands and
Pueblos. See id. The Court regarded Arizona Public's complaint as to the ade-
quacy of public comment on tribal applications as moot. See id. Additionally, the
court rejected Arizona Public's challenge to EPA's decision to exempt Tribes from
certain judicial requirements under CAA and determined that Arizona Public's
claim that EPA abrogated preexisting agreements between Tribes and regulated
industry was unripe for review. See id. This Note primarily focuses on Arizona
Public's principal contention that EPA granted Tribes too much authority in its
Final Rule and whether Congress expressly delegated to Tribes the authority to
regulate air quality on all land within reservations, including non-member fee
lands. See id.
87. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (outlining two-step test for reviewing agency's construction
of agency-administered statutes); see also Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1287. If, after
exhausting the traditional tools of statutory construction, a reviewing court deter-
mines that congressional intent is nonetheless ambiguous, the reviewing court is to
employ the second step of the Chevron analysis by upholding an agency's interpre-
tation only where it is reasonable. See id. For a further discussion of the Chevron
two part test, see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
88. Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d
741, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43)).
89. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1286 (quoting Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610,
615 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (stating "[a]s long as the agency stays within [Congress']
delegation, it is free to make policy choices in interpreting [a] statute, and such
interpretations are entitled to deference.").
90. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1287 (citing Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC,
131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). The Arizona Public court stated that "[i]f, in
light of its text, legislative history, strncture, and purpose, a statute is found to be
plain in its meaning, 'then Congress has expressed its intention as to the question,
and deference is not appropriate."' Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Bell
Atlantic Tel. Cos., 131 F.3d at 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
91. See id. (highlighting principal issue disputed).
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that Tribes retain a significant sovereign power.92 Though the D.C.
Circuit admitted that "[t]here are few examples of congressional
delegation of authority to [T]ribes," 93 it nonetheless embarked
upon a review of EPA's interpretation of CAA according to the
traditional principles of statutory interpretation.94 Ultimately, the
Arizona Public court determined that its review of CAA indicated
that EPA's interpretation of the statute comported with congres-
sional intent.95
The D.C. Circuit Court found section 7601 (d) of CAA author-
ized EPA to treat eligible Tribes as States if "the functions to be
exercised by the [Tribe] pertain[ed] to the management and pro-
tection of air resources within the exterior boundaries of the reser-
vation or other areas within the [Tribe's] jurisdiction. '96 According
to the D.C. Circuit, "[t] he statute's clear distinction between areas
'within the exterior boundaries of the reservation' and 'other areas
within the [Tribe's] jurisdiction' carrie[d] with it the implication
that Congress considered the areas within the exterior boundaries
of a [Tribe's] reservation to be per se within the [Tribe's] jurisdic-
tion. 97 Rooting its holding in both the textual and structural
make-up of CAA, the Arizona Public court upheld EPA's interpreta-
tion of section 7601 (d) (2) (B) as an expression of congressional in-
tent to grant Tribes jurisdiction over non-member fee lands within
the borders of a reservation.98
92. See id. (stating that "[Tribes] have inherent power to determine forms of
tribal government, to determine tribal membership, to make substantive criminal
and civil laws governing internal matters, to administer tribal judicial systems, to
exclude others from tribal lands, and, to some extent, to exercise civil jurisdiction
over non-members, including non-Indians.").
93. Id. at 1288 (quoting Felix S. Cohen, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FED-
ERAL INDIAN LAw 231, 253 (1982)).
94. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1288. The D.C. Circuit sought to determine
through traditional sources of interpretation whether, in fact, Congress intended
to delegate to Tribes the authority to administer CAA programs over non-member
fee lands within reservations. See id. To make this determination, the D.C. Circuit
examined CAA's text, structure, purpose and legislative history. See id.
95. See id. (affirming EPA's interpretation of CAA as express congressional
delegation of authority to Tribes to enforce air quality standards on fee lands).
96. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (2) (B)).
97. Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1288.
98. See id. (finding that EPA correctly interpreted § 7601 (d) as express grant
of Tribal jurisdiction over non-member fee lands within reservation borders with-
out requiring case-by-case determination of whether the Tribe, in fact, possesses
inherent sovereign power). The Supreme Court, in Montana v. United States, held
that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent sta-
tus of [Tribes], and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation."
Id. at 1287 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)). The Mon-
tana ruling permitted Tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-members on fee
18
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The D.C. Circuit further noted that the primary purpose of
CAA is to ensure "effective enforcement of clean air standards."99 It
therefore determined that denying Tribes' jurisdiction over non-
member fee lands contradicted the purpose of CAA, resulting in a
"checkerboard" pattern of air quality regulation within reservation
boundaries.' 00
Furthermore, the Arizona Public court found that the legislative
history of the 1990 Amendments supported EPA's interpretation of
CAA. 1° 1 The D.C. Circuit's review revealed that the language of
CAA section 7601 (d) (2) (B), as originally introduced, differed in
large part from the language of the statute as enacted.1 1 2 The Ai-
zona Public majority determined that this textual alteration strongly
lands only in the event that the non-members' behavior within the reservation
"threaten [ed] or [had] some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the [T] ribe." Id. at 566. The Supreme Court
decision, in Brendale v. Confederated Tibes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
heightened the Montana standard. See Brendale, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989) (White,
J., plurality). To satisfy this heightened standard, a Tribe must be capable of show-
ing, on a "case-by-case basis," that the non-member activity constituted a "demon-
strably serious" impact that "imperil[ed] the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health and welfare of the [T]ribe." Brendale at 431. The Arizona
Public court's finding removed these requirements with regard to tribal jurisdiction
and the regulation of air quality under the 1990 Amendments to CAA. See Arizona
Public, 211 F.3d at 1288.
99. Id. (noting that neither Arizona Public Service nor EPA disputed idea of
effective enforcement of clean air standards as primary purpose of CAA). The
Arizona Public court also acknowledged that CAA goals would be satisfied best if
Tribes and States established uniform standards within state and tribal boundaries.
See id.
100. See id. (holding that this type of "checkerboard" regulation would be in-
consistent with purpose and provisions of CAA). The D.C. Circuit observed that
"[t]he high mobility of air pollutants, resulting areawide [sic] effects and the seri-
ousness of such impacts, underscores the undesirability of fragmented air quality
management." Id. (quoting Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,959; see also Moe v.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463,
479 (1976) (rejecting checkerboard approach in interpreting General Allotment
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 349); Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Peniten-
tiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962) (holding checkerboard jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 impractical).
101. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1289 (noting differences between
§ 7601(d) as originally introduced to Congress and § 7601(d) as enacted). For a
discussion of the differences between the bill as introduced and the statute as en-
acted, see infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
102. See id. at 1289. The D.C. Circuit observed that § 7601(d) (2) (B) origi-
nally authorized the treatment of Tribes as States if "the functions to be exercised
by the Indian [T] ibe are within the area of the [tiribal government's jurisdiction." S.
1630, 101st Cong. § 113(a) (1990), reprinted in Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub.
Works, 103d Cong., Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 4283
(1993) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1990 Legislative History]; see also H.R. 2323,
101st Cong. § 604 (1989), reprinted in LEGIsLATrVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AcT
AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 4283 (1993). The statute, as finally enacted, however,
treated Tribes and States as equivalent under CAA provisions where Tribes act
2001]
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suggested that Congress viewed all areas within the exterior bound-
aries of a reservation to be within a Tribe's jurisdiction. 0 3 Accord-
ing to the Arizona Public court, the textual change "indicated that
Congress knew how to draft the 1990 Amendments to support peti-
tioner's interpretation," but chose language consistent with EPA's
interpretation.10 4 The majority further advanced this argument
through a comparison of CAA with CWA. 105 For the majority,
"there [was] no doubt that Congress may delegate authority to
[T]ribes even though the lands [are] held in fee by [non-mem-
bers], and even though the persons regulated are [non-
members] ."106
2. Circuit Judge Ginsburg's Dissenting Opinion
Writing the sole dissenting opinion in Arizona Public, Circuit
Judge Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's determination that 42
"within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the
[T]ribe's jurisdiction." 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B).
103. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1289 (asserting that Congress' move from
generally authorizing tribal regulation over areas "within the tribal government's
jurisdiction" to more specific, bifurcated classification of all areas "within the exte-
rior boundaries of the reservation" and "other areas within Tribe's jurisdiction"
demonstrates congressional intent to grant Tribes regulatory authority over mem-
ber lands and non-member fee lands alike).
104. See id. (noting statutory language strengthened majority's position that
EPA correctly ascertained congressional intent in passing 1990 Amendments).
105. See id. at 1291 (finding Arizona Public's assertion that no difference ex-
ists between court provisions and disputed CAA provisions meritless). The major-
ity noted that because CWA's legislative history was "ambiguous and inconclusive,"
EPA could not expand or limit tribal authority beyond that inherent in the Tribe.
See id. (citing Amendments to Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (1991) (codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 131)). Conversely, the legislative history of the 1990 CAA Amend-
ments is not "ambiguous or inconclusive," but plainly supports EPA's finding of an
express congressional delegation. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1289 (holding
CAA and CWA language similar, but not identical). Therefore, Congress did not
need to take as cautious a view of CAA as with CWA. See id. The Arizona Public
court also found it significant that CWA was never subject tojudicial review regard-
ing the existence of an express congressional delegation to Tribes to regulate fee
lands within reservations. See id. at 1292 (noting dicta in Montana v. EPA, 941 F.
Supp. 945, 951 (1996)). The Arizona Public court also found that "statutory lan-
guage [in CWA] seem [ed] to indicate plainly that Congress did intend to delegate
... authority to [T]ribes." Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1292 (emphasis added)).
106. Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1291 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544, 544 (1975)) (finding Arizona Public's argument that Tribes may not promul-
gate regulations covering lands held in fee by persons other than tribal members
meritless). The majority found Arizona Public's argument flawed because it failed
to recognize that the relationship between Tribes and fee holders is different from
the relationship between Tribes and States. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1291
(quoting Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 544) (maintaining that "Indian [T]ribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and
their territory.").
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U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2) (B) expressly delegated to Tribes the authority
to enforce the provisions of CAA over non-member fee lands within
a reservation.10 7 Ginsburg cited the Montana decision to support
the proposition that absent inherent Tribal authority or the threat
of adverse effects, tribal regulation of non-member fee lands within
reservations required an express congressional delegation of such
authority. 10 8 Following the Montana rationale, Ginsburg main-
tained that, unless the 1990 CAA Amendments expressly delegated
to Tribes the authority to regulate air quality over non-member fee
lands and rights-of-way within reservations, EPA's Final Rule must
be set aside.' 0 9 While Ginsburg identified the existence of an ex-
press congressional delegation in CAA section 7410(o), he could
not agree that section 7601(d) (2) (B) contained a similar
provision.110
107. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1300 (Ginsburg, CJ., dissenting in part)
(holding "[w]ith certain exceptions, [T] ribe [s] lack inherent authority to regulate
non-member fee lands within reservation boundaries."). Ginsburg determined
that tribal regulation of fee lands within a reservation requires an express congres-
sional delegation of authority to regulate fee lands. See id. Though Ginsburg
noted that Tribes may demonstrate their inherent authority over such lands pursu-
ant to the Montana rule and its exceptions, he ultimately concluded that
§ 7601 (d) (2) (B) did not contain an express delegation of authority to Tribes to
regulate the conduct and/or activities of non-members on fee lands within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation. See id. at 1305. Thus, Ginsburg dissented
in part from the opinion of the majority. See id. at 1300.
108. See id. (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)) (holding
Tribes generally lack authority to regulate non-member fee lands, but noting "[a]
[T] ribe may ... retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct
of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security or the
health or welfare of the [T]ribes.").
109. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1301 (observing that 1990 Amendments
added two provisions to CAA relevant to question of whether Tribes have authority
to enforce CAA on non-member fee lands). Ginsburg cited §§ 7410(o) and
7601 (d) (2) (B) as CAA sections relevant to the issue of express congressional au-
thority. See id. For a further discussion of § 7410(o), see supra note 57 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of § 7601(d) (2) (B), see supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
110. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1301 (Ginsburg, CJ., dissenting in part)
(maintaining that § 7410(o) is "self-evidently an express congressional delegation
of authority to enforce TIPs on fee lands . . . within a reservation."). Since
§ 7410(o) addresses the enforcement of TIPs only, Ginsburg determined that it
was necessary that EPA demonstrate that § 7601 (d) (2) (B) likewise contained an
express congressional delegation to support its position. See id. Finding that
§ 7601 (d)(2)(B) did not contain an express delegation similar to § 7410(o), Gins-
burg disagreed with EPA's Final Rule insofar as it contradicted the Montana rule
and permitted Tribes to regulate fee lands without first demonstrating their inher-
ent authority over such lands or establishing their authority pursuant to Montana's
exceptions. See id. For Ginsburg, the focal point in reviewing EPA's Final Rule
regulations and rationale was not EPA's interpretation of the statute, but the text
of the statute itself. See id. Ginsburg argued that EPA's interpretation could not
prevail by a mere showing that it's reading of § 7601(d)(2)(B) was reasonable;
21
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Ginsburg looked first to the "notwithstanding" proviso to sup-
port this position.11' Additionally, Ginsburg cited the omission of a
literal delegation provision from the enacted statute as it appeared
in CAA's introductory bill as evidence that Congress did not intend
to create an express delegation within section 7601(d) (2) (B). 11 2
Ginsburg further noted that the majority "misapprehend[ed] the
significance of the phrase 'within exterior boundaries of the reser-
vation or other areas within the [T] ribe's jurisdiction.""' ," Finally,
EPA's reading must be correct. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1301-04. Conse-
quently, Ginsburg focused his analysis on the statute's plain language. See id.
111. See id. at 1302-03 (revealing that notwithstanding proviso was featured in
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) and Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 715
n.1 (1983)). Prior to Arizona Public, Mazurie and Rice were the only two cases in
which the Supreme Court found express congressional delegations of authority.
See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1290. The "notwithstanding" proviso, as it appears in
§ 7410(o), provides in pertinent part, "the [TIP] shall become applicable to all
areas... located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent and including rights-of-way running through the reservation." 42
U.S.C. § 7410(o) (emphasis added). For Ginsburg, the omission of the Court-
tested "notwithstanding" proviso from § 7601(d) (2) (B), as it was used in
§ 7410(o), indicated that Congress did not intend § 7601 (d) (2) (B) as an express
congressional delegation. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1302. Because the two
sections were enacted at the same time in the same section of the same bill, Gins-
burg could not agree that the difference in phrasing was a mere "artifact of legisla-
tive haphazardry." See id.; see also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 428 (1989) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151 and 1161 to-
gether as express congressional delegations of authority over fee lands).
112. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1303. The original bill, introducing the
1990 Amendments to CAA and, by extension, § 7601 (d) (2) (B) to the House of
Representatives and the Senate, contained a provision, stating that "the Adminis-
trator... may delegate to [ I [TJribes primary responsibility for assuring air quality
and enforcement of air pollution." H.R. 2323, 101st Cong. § 604, reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR Acr AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 4053, 4101
(1993). The Senate passed a similar bill, S. 1630, with the literal delegation intact.
See S. 1630, 101st Cong. §111, reprinted in 5 1990 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 9050, 9145.
In conference, the House and Senate passed S. 1630 as amended by substituting
H.R. 3030, omitting the literal delegation provision. See H.R. 3030, 2 1990 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, 1809, 1972-73. The House version thus prevailed in conference. See
Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1303 (tracking legislative progress of 1990 Amend-
ments). Thus, the 1990 Amendments were enacted into law absent the literal dele-
gation provision. See id. (revealing that 1990 Amendments as enacted into law did
not contain literal delegation provision). Ginsburg believed that Congress' direct
rejection of specific language favorable to EPA's position was evidence that the
legislature did not intend to create an express delegation of authority in
§ 7601(d) (2) (B). See id.
113. Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1304. Ginsburg determined that H.R. 3030, as
originally enacted, referred only to air resources "within the exterior boundaries of
the reservation." Id. (citing H.R. 2323). However, the House Committee on En-
ergy and Commerce, without comment, added the phrase "or other areas within
the [T] ribes jurisdiction" during conference. Id. (citing H.R. 3030). Ultimately,
the amended House version prevailed at conference. See id. Ginsburg observed
that the legislative record is silent on the meaning or intention of the added
phrase. See id. According to Ginsburg, "[t]he most straightforward interpretation
of the addition is that the Committee wanted to ensure that the treatment of
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Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's proposition that a "checker-
board" regulation, inconsistent with the purpose and provisions of
CAA, would result from a failure to read section 7601 (d) (2) (B) as
expressly delegating to Tribes the authority to regulate air quality
on all lands within their reservations. 114 Consequently, Ginsburg
found fault with the majority's finding that Tribes possess regula-
tory authority over non-member fee lands under CAA
section 7601 (d) (2) (B). 1 5
B. Critical Analysis
Recognizing that environmental regulation is essential to any
attempt by Tribes to protect tribal lands, the Arizona Public court
aptly concluded that CAA section 7601(d)(2)(B) delegates to a
Tribe's regulatory authority over all lands within the exterior
bounds of the reservation.' 16 Rooting its decision in the principles
[T]ribes as [S]tates extended beyond the reservation to non-contiguous areas of
[t]ribal authority, such as dependent Indian communities." Id. For Ginsburg, the
likelihood that the House Committee intended the phrase as a delegation of au-
thority over non-member fee lands was doubtful. See id.
114. See id. (finding it is not clear that "checkerboard" pattern of regulation,
inconsistent with purpose and provisions of CAA, would result because Tribes re-
mained free to exert their inherent authority over any activity of non-member fee
lands that threaten health and welfare of tribal land under Montana rule). Gins-
burg also maintained that tribal authority over less than all lands within the bor-
ders of the reservation was the logical result of the Tribes' "diminished status as
sovereigns." See id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).
115. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1305 (dissenting from majority's conclu-
sion that § 7601 (d) (2) (B) delegated to Tribes authority to regulate non-member
fee lands). The majority responded to Ginsburg's arguments, determining that
Congress' omission of the "notwithstanding" proviso from § 7601 (d) (2) (B) was in-
effectual. See id. at 1289 (noting CAA's use of new formulation was not determina-
tive factor in deciding whether § 7601 (d) (2) (B) constituted express congressional
delegation of authority to Tribes). The majority also found Ginsburg's assertion
that Congress' failure to insert a literal delegation of authority to Tribes negated
the existence of an express congressional delegation was unconvincing. See id. at
1290 (admitting literal delegation present in original bill but holding omission of
such language from final enactment did not compel conclusion that Congress spe-
cifically rejected language and, by extension, EPA's position that statute contained
express congressional delegation). According to the majority, Congress may have
omitted the original language, finding it redundant or confusing. See id. (holding
original language can be read as applying to all areas within or without reservation
whereas Congress intended express delegation to apply to all areas within reserva-
tion only). The D.C. Circuit ultimately weighed the language adopted in
§ 7601 (d) (2) (B) more heavily than the language omitted. See id. (finding omitted
language hardly constituted literal delegation).
116. See Gover & Walker, supra note 61, at 438 (noting importance of tribal
regulatory authority within reservations); see also Cochran, supra note 63, at 323)
(stating "[w]hen Congress amended [CAA] in 1990, it added a new provision per-
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of Chevron, the D.C. Circuit correctly determined that EPA's inter-
pretation of the statute comported with both the statute's plain lan-
guage and Congress' legislative intent.'1 7 Despite the lack of
common law precedent regarding express congressional delega-
tions to Tribes under CAA, the Arizona Public majority appropriately
fashioned its conclusion upon the principle that statutes should be
construed to comply with "tribal sovereignty and the federal policy
of encouraging tribal independence." ' 18 3 Overall, the Arizona Public
decision best complies with CAA's enunciated goals.' 19
Conversely, Circuit Judge Ginsburg's dissenting opinion mis-
construed the language of section 7601(d) (2) (B).' 20 In contend-
ing that section 7410(o), not section 7601 (d) (2) (B), constituted an
express congressional delegation of authority, Ginsburg interpreted
CAA too narrowly. 21 Ginsburg's dissent therefore contravenes
Congress' plan to "broaden tribal regulatory authority over air re-
sources within reservation boundaries and other areas under tribal
jurisdiction." 22
1. Majority Decision
a. Plain Language of 1990 CAA Amendments
Like EPA, the Arizona Public court based its interpretation of
the 1990 CAA Amendments on the language, structure and frame-
117. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1288 (holding that clear distinction in
§ 7601 (d) (2) (B) between areas "within the exterior boundaries of the reservation"
and "other areas within the [T]ribe's jurisdiction" carries implication that Con-
gress considered areas within exterior boundaries of Tribe's reservation to be per se
within Tribe's jurisdiction); see also Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7258 (maintaining
that EPA's interpretation of 1990 Amendments as providing express congressional
delegation of authority to Tribes is consistent with language, structure and legisla-
tive history of CAA amendments).
118. Id. at 7255 (citing Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Reve-
nue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 846 (1982)) (stating that "statutes should be
interpreted so as to comport with tribal sovereignty and the federal policy of en-
couraging tribal independence.").
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c). Title 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c) reveals that "[a] pri-
mary goal of [CAA] is to encourage or otherwise promote reasonable federal,
state, and local governmental actions, consistent with the provisions of [CAA], for
pollution purposes." Id.
120. For a further discussion of Ginsburg's dissent, see supra notes 107-115
and accompanying text.
121. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1301-03 (arguing "[i]f [§ 7601 (d) (2) (B) ] is
so clear as to constitute an express congressional delegation, it is difficult to be-
lieve that Congress would 'reinforce' this point in a narrower provision
[§ 7410(o)] enacted at the same time as and expressly cross-referencing
[§ 7601(d)].").
122. See Cochran, supra note 63, at 323 (noting Congress' purpose in enacting
1990 Amendments was to broaden Tribes' regulatory power over all lands within
reservations).
24
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss2/4
ARIZONA PUBLIC
work of the statute.123 Explicitly, CAA authorizes EPA to treat
Tribes as States for the purpose of regulating air quality "within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the
[T] ribe's jurisdiction. ' 124 The statute draws no distinction between
tribal lands and non-member fee lands.1 25 The Arizona Public court
therefore upheld EPA's claim that CAA's language and framework
"manifest[ ] an intent for a territorial approach to tribal jurisdic-
tion and allow[ ] a tribal role for all air resources within a reserva-
tion's exterior boundaries without distinguishing among types of
on-reservation land."1 26 Thus, the D.C. Circuit properly upheld
EPA's interpretation of section 7601 (d), inferring from CAA's lan-
guage that Congress intended all areas within a Tribe's reservation
to be per se within a Tribe's jurisdiction. 2 7
b. Legislative History of 1990 CAA Amendments
"Congress is the source of the power for the CAA." 128 Con-
gress passed the 1990 CAA Amendments to ensure that Tribes fully
participate in the management, regulation and protection of air
123. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1288 (revealing Arizona Public majority be-
gan its analysis of EPA's interpretation with "traditional sources of statutory inter-
pretation, including the statute's text, structure, purpose, and legislative history");
see also Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984) (maintaining
that scope of statute is determined from its express language as well as its structure,
statutory scheme, objectives and legislative history).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (2) (B); see also Gelles, supra note 7, at 383 (reporting
EPA found its interpretation of 1990 CAA Amendments consistent with statute's
language). "The statutory language [of the 1990 Amendments] implies that it will
be appropriate for a Tribe to regulate air resources within the exterior boundaries
of the reservation or other areas within the Tribe's jurisdiction." Id. at 380-81.
125. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7255 (stating "[i]f Congress intended to
require [T]ribes to demonstrate jurisdiction over reservations, Congress would
have simply stated that EPA may approve a tribal program only for air resources
over which the Tribe can demonstrate jurisdiction.").
126. Gelles, supra note 7, at 383 (revealing that EPA based its delegation inter-
pretation on CAA's structure and framework); see also Cochran, supra note 63, at
338 (stating "[t]he plain language of the CAA... support[s] the EPA's interpreta-
tion that the CAA grants [T]ribes regulatory authority over air resources within
[reservations].").
127. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1288 (holding EPA correctly interpreted
§ 7601 (d) to express congressional intent to grant Tribes jurisdiction over non-
member fee land within reservations).
128. Cochran, supra note 63, at 334 (revealing that Congress has broad au-
thority to delegate legislative powers to Tribes as governing entities with sovereign
authority over their lands and members). While Congress is the source of tribal
regulatory authority over air resources, EPA is the secondary source of that author-
ity. See id. at 334-36. "Congress created a broad environmental scheme, and the
EPA, under its administrative authority, properly established a regulatory scheme
permissible under this authority." Id. at 338-39.
2001]
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quality standards within reservations. 129 The Arizona Public court ac-
curately noted that the legislative history of the 1990 CAA Amend-
ments supports EPA's finding that the statute contains an express
congressional delegation of authority to Tribes to regulate air qual-
ity over all reservation lands.' 30 The D.C. Circuit properly focused
on the difference between the language of the CAA bill, as it was
originally introduced to Congress, and the language of CAA as it
was finally enacted.131 While the language of the introductory bill
restricted tribal regulatory authority specifically to lands within tri-
bal jurisdiction, the enacted statute admitted a broader grant of
regulatory authority to Tribes.1 32 Considering this textual altera-
tion in conjunction with the federal government's overall policy of
promoting tribal self-determination, the D.C. Circuit accurately de-
termined that CAA section 7601 (d) (2) (B) expressly delegated to
Tribes the authority to regulate air quality standards over all lands
within the reservation, including non-member fee lands. 13 3 Con-
gress intended the 1990 Amendments to expand tribal authority
under CAA beyond redesignation, authorizing Tribes' development
of plans for implementing, maintaining and enforcing air quality
standards. 3 4 CAA's legislative history reveals, "[t]he purpose of
[the 1990 Amendments] is to improve the environmental quality of
the air witin [sic] Indian country in a manner consistent with the
EPA's Indian Policy and 'the overall Federal position in support of
Tribal self-government and the government-to-government rela-
129. See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 79 (1989), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN AIR AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 8419 (announcing that 1990 Amend-
ments are "necessary to ensure that [T] ribes will be allowed to participate fully in
programs established by [CAA] as they take affirmative measures to manage, regu-
late, and protect air quality"); see also Reding, supra note 31, at 174 (noting that
"Congress amended the CAA in 1990 with the idea of supporting [t]ribal self-
government").
130. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1289 (determining that CAA's legislative
history reveals Congress' deliberate choice to grant Tribes regulatory authority
over all reservation lands).
131. See id. (noting that CAA § 7601(d) as it was originally introduced dif-
fered significandy from final adopted version of statute).
132. For a further discussion of the textual differences between the bill as
introduced and the bill as passed, see supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
133. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1289 (holding that bifurcated classification
of all areas within "the exterior boundaries of the reservation" and "other areas
within the tribe's jurisdiction" comports with EPA's determination that tribal regu-
latory authority extends to all reservation lands); see also Royster, supra note 1, at 89
(noting Congress' overall path of promoting and encouraging Tribes' economic
development and self-sufficiency).
134. See id. at 94 (stating that amendments to SDWA, Superfund, CWA and
CAA have all generally provided that Tribes be treated as States).
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tions between Federal and Tribal Governments."' 1 35 It is, there-
fore, logical to assume that CAA authority would permit a Tribe to
regulate a proposed activity on non-member fee lands within the
bounds of the reservation that would "cause a deterioration of air
quality" below the permitted standard. 13
6
Consequently, Circuit Judge Ginsburg's argument that Con-
gress' omission of a literal delegation negated the existence of an
express congressional delegation within section 7601(d) (2) (B)
seems misplaced. 137 The lack of a "literal delegation" of tribal regu-
latory authority is unimportant; "[s] ometimes the legislative delega-
tion to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. '1 38 Because Congress clearly declared that its purpose in
enacting the 1990 CAA Amendments was to empower Tribes with
regulatory authority over all reservation lands, the absence of spe-
cific language literally delegating that power to Tribes is inconse-
quential. 139 Overall, CAA's legislative history indicates that the
1990 Amendments "constitute[ ] an express delegation of power to
Indian [T]ribes to administer and enforce the [CAA] in Indian
lands. 1 40
135. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 79, 80 (1993), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 8419-20; see also Final Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 7256 (stating "read as a whole, the Senate Report supports EPA's interpre-
tation that the CAA is a delegation.").
136. See Royster, supra note 1, at 94 (observing that express congressional del-
egation would seem to grant Tribes regulatory authority over member and non-
member lands given Congress' purpose in enacting 1990 CAA Amendments); see
also Reding, supra note 31, at 174 (observing that "Congress expressly delegated to
tribal governments the administrative and enforcement power of regulating ambi-
ent air quality and standards on tribal lands" notwithstanding ownership).
137. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1303. For a further discussion of Gins-
burg's position regarding the omission of an express congressional delegation, see
supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
138. Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1989) (declaring that explicit, literal delegation is not necessary for ex-
press congressional delegation to exist).
139. SeeGover & Walker, supra note 61, at 443 (noting that "[t]he effect of the
regulations was to grant the Indian [T]ribes the same degree of autonomy to de-
termine the quality of their air as was granted to the States" and stating, "we [can-
not] say that the [CAA] constitutes a clear expression of congressional intent to
subordinate the [T]ribes to [S]tate decision making."); see also Final Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 7255 (observing "nothing in [CAA] or legislative history suggests that Con-
gress intended to limit so severely the universe of [T]ribes eligible for CAA pro-
grams."); Coursen, supra note 34, at 10597 (reporting that "[t]he legislative history
of the CAA.. . contains language that appears to reflect Congress' intent to effect
a statutory delegation of authority.").
140. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 79, 80 (1989), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 8419-20 (drawing a comparison be-
tween 1990 CAA Amendments and current SDWA and CWA provisions granting
Tribes regulatory control over reservation lands).
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Notably, the discussion section of CAA's legislative history com-
pares the delegation of authority in CAA to similar delegations in
SDWA and CWA. 141 The SDWA provides for Tribes' treatment as
States where "the functions to be exercised by the Indian Tribe are
within the area of the tribal government's jurisdiction."1 42 Simi-
larly, CWA allows Tribes' treatment as States where:
the functions to be exercised by the Indian [T]ribe per-
tain to the management and protection of water resources
which are held by an Indian [T]ribe, held by the United
States in trust for Indians, held by a member of an Indian
tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust restric-
tion in alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an
Indian reservation. 143
CAA, however, is more precise in delineating the scope of tribal
regulatory authority under its programs.' 44 While SDWA grants
Tribes' regulatory power only over lands within their jurisdiction,
CWA is more ambiguous in its grant of authority. 145 Conversely,
the language and legislative history of CAA is neither ambiguous
nor inconclusive. 14 6 Nothing in CAA nor its legislative history sug-
gests that Congress intended to limit so severely the universe of tri-
141. See id. (noting that CAA § 7601 (d) (2) incorporates language from SDWA
tribal amendments regarding which provisions Tribes' treatment as States is
appropriate).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-1 1(b) (2) (1991 & Supp. 1997). For a further discussion
of SDWA, see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
143. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2) (Supp. 2000). The Arizona Public majority admits
that CWA and CAA language are similar, but not identical. See Arizona Public, 211
F.3d at 1292. CAA illustrates a clear distinction between areas "within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation" and "other areas within the [T]ribe's jurisdiction."
See id. While CWA has not yet been subject to judicial review on the exact issue of
whether or not the statute contained an express congressional delegation of regu-
latory authority to Tribes, in dicta, the district court in Montana v. EPA observed
that "the statutory language [in CWA] seems to indicate plainly that Congress did
intend to delegate . . .authority to [T]ribes." Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945,
951 (D. Mont. 1996). For a further discussion of CWA, see supra note 46 and ac-
companying text.
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (2) (B) (authorizing Tribes to regulate air quality
standards over all areas within exterior boundaries of reservation as well as other
areas deemed within Tribes' jurisdiction).
145. Compare SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (b) (1) (B) (limiting tribal regulatory
authority to lands within tribal government's jurisdiction), with CWA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377(e) (listing array of lands over which Tribes may exercise regulatory author-
ity without conclusively defining scope of that authority). For a further discussion
of SDWA and CWA, see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
146. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1292 (holding CAA's clear distinction be-
tween areas "within the exterior boundaries of the reservation" and "other areas
within the [T]ribe'sjurisdiction" indicates Congress' intent to define areas within
exterior boundaries of Tribes' reservations to be per se within Tribes'jurisdiction).
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bal regulatory powers to only those lands under tribal
jurisdiction. 147
c. Chevron Application
The Arizona Public majority properly rooted its analysis of EPA's
interpretation of CAA in the familiar principles of Chevron v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council.148 Applying the Chevron test, the Ai-
zona Public court correctly determined that EPA acted within the
bounds of congressional delegation. 149 Following the Chevron man-
date to examine CAA's plain meaning, the Arizona Public court de-
termined that the 1990 CAA Amendments plainly delegated to
Tribes the authority to regulate all reservation lands, including non-
member fee lands. 150 The Chevron Court clearly stated that "a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the Administrator of an
agency. '" 151 Under the Chevron principle, "[i]f a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress
had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is
the law and must be given effect."' 5 2 Thus, under Chevron, the Ari-
zona Public court's determination that section 7601 (d) constitutes




Currently, environmental regulatory jurisdiction within Indian
reservations is divided among federal, tribal and state govern-
147. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7255 (observing that it was not Congress'
intent to restrict tribal regulatory authority and exclude non-member fee lands
within reservation borders).
148. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1287 (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). For a further discussion of the
Chevron test, see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
149. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1287 (explaining that D.C. Circuit's pri-
mary concern under Chevron was to ensure that EPA acted within bounds of con-
gressional delegation).
150. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (1984) (stating that court's examination
of statute's plain meaning is first prong of Chevron two part test). Because the D.C.
Circuit determined that the 1990 CAA Amendments admitted a plain meaning, it
was not required to examine the reasonableness of EPA's interpretation. See Ari-
zona Public, 211 F.3d at 1288.
151. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (reasoning that administrative agencies have
specialized knowledge allowing them to interpret statutory provisions).
152. Id. at 843 n.9; see also Gelles, supra note 7, at 385 (remarking that courts
do not often overrule EPA when it invokes Chevron to determine applicability of
laws to Tribes).
153. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (holding that "[tihe judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory construction.").
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ments. 54 Tribes derive their regulatory powers from either their
inherent authority or, where such authority is lacking, valid con-
gressional delegations. 155 Finding that Tribes' regulatory authority
over non-member fee lands fell outside the ambit of its inherent
powers, EPA appropriately determined that the 1990 CAA Amend-
ments expressly granted to Tribes the authority to implement and
enforce air quality standards over all reservation lands.156
EPA premised its Indian policy on promoting tribal seWf-deter-
mination. 57 Assuming that Tribes generally lack inherent author-
154. See Cochran, supra note 63, at 338 (highlighting division of power operat-
ing within boundaries of reservation). Federal, tribal and state governments each
assert different bases for their regulatory authority. See id. The federal govern-
ment derives its regulatory authority from both Congress' plenary power over
Tribes and the judicial doctrine subjecting Tribes to federal laws of general appli-
cability. See id. States' asserted rights stem from the states' "refusal ... to perceive
[reservations] as extraterritorial to state borders." Id. Tribes derive their regula-
tory authority either from their inherent sovereign powers or from express con-
gressional delegations. See id.
155. See id. at 323 (revealing sources of tribal regulatory authority over air
quality standards). It is only in those circumstances where tribal sovereignty has
been divested that congressional delegations of authority are necessary. See Red-
ing, supra note 31, at 174.
156. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7255 (noting that it is not necessary for
Tribes to have independent authority over all matters that would be subject to
delegated authority). According to EPA's Final Rule, "[e]ven in a case where a
particular Tribe's inherent authority is markedly limited, the detailed parameters
outlined in the CAA and EPA's oversight role over tribal exercise of authority dele-
gated by the CAA are sufficient to ensure that Constitutional limitations on the
delegated authority have not been exceeded." Id. at 7257.
157. See Reding, supra note 31, at 171-72 (reporting that "EPA situate[d] itself
in a position consistent with and complimentary to the framework of federal In-
dian policy goals and federal Indian law"); see also Cochran, supra note 63, at 324
(reporting that EPA's policy for "reservation-based environmental programs" takes
affirmative steps to encourage and assist Tribes in assuming greater regulatory re-
sponsibilities). "Additional support for a valid delegation of authority is found
within EPA's policy statements regarding the administration of environmental pro-
grams and regulations within Indian environments." Id. at 348. EPA's Indian Pol-
icy recognizes tribal governments as sovereign nations. See id. EPA's Indian Policy
set forth nine principles, outlining EPA-Tribal relations. See id. at 348 n.Il (citing
EPA Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian Reserva-
tions 1 (Nov. 8, 1984)). First, EPA vowed to work directly with Tribes. See id. Sec-
ond, EPA recognized Tribes as the leading environmental policy makers within
Indian Country. See Cochran, supra note 63, at 348 n.11. Third, EPA devoted itself
to helping Tribes assume implementation responsibilities and develop TIPs. See
id. Fourth, EPA agreed to remove legal and procedural constraints facing Tribes.
See id. Fifth, EPA assured consideration of tribal concerns and interests in EPA
policy decisions. See id. Sixth, EPA encouraged Tribal and State cooperative agree-
ments. See id. Seventh, EPA promised to work with other agencies to assist Tribes
in assuming responsibility for environmental programs. See Cochran, supra note 63
at 348 n. 11. Eighth, EPA stated it would work with tribal governments to bring
tribal enterprises into compliance with its policy; "non-tribal enterprises not in
compliance will become subject to EPA enforcement actions." Id. Finally, EPA
promised to "incorporate these policy principles into planning and management
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ity to regulate air quality over non-member fee lands within the
reservation, EPA's finding that CAA constituted an express congres-
sional delegation of authority to Tribes furthers EPA's policy to-
ward advancing tribal sovereign authority over the environmental
condition of reservation lands. 158 Denying Tribes the ability to con-
trol and regulate reservation resources, in effect, denies tribal sover-
eignty and self-determination. 5 9
"Territory is the sine qua non of sovereignty."' 60  Conse-
quently, extending the Montana and Brendale decisions to prohibit
tribal regulation of fee land air quality poses serious threats to tribal
sovereignty.'61 These decisions fail to recognize the inherent logic
in encouraging tribal management of reservation air quality. 162 Es-
sentially, "[a]ctive tribal participation in environmental protection
programs [ ] enable [s] tribal members to develop technical and ad-
ministrative expertise complementary to the current policy of tribal
self-government."' 163 Thus, the D.C. Circuit's determination in Ari-
zona Public that CAA section 7601 (d) (2) (B) constituted an express
delegation of regulatory authority to Tribes to implement and en-
force air quality standards best comports with principles of tribal
sovereignty, thereby encouraging tribal participation in environ-
mental affairs.164
activities." Id. For a further discussion of EPA's Indian Policy, see supra notes 59-60
and accompanying text.
158. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7255 (highlighting tribal commenters' as-
sertion that CAA language and federal Indian Law principles compel EPA's delega-
tion approach); see also Cochran, supra note 63, at 325 (revealing EPA's stance on
[t] ribal sovereignty issues and environmental regulatory authority).
159. See Royster, supra note 1, at 89 (observing "a government that has lost the
authority ... to control [reservation resources] has lost as well the full capability to
control environmentally harmful [activities].").
160. Id. (declaring tribal sovereignty revolves around Tribe's ability to govern
its land).
161. See id. at 93 (noting that Brendale Court's extension of Montana test repre-
sents serious threat to tribal sovereignty for most Tribes). For a further discussion
of Montana and Brendale, see supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
162. SeeReding, supra note 31, at 175 (asserting that government "at the tribal
level is potentially more hospitable to unique tribal situations and solutions and
takes more fully into account tribal interests.").
163. Id. at 174 (maintaining that more informed tribal input in tribal air qual-
ity regulations facilitates CAA compliance, executing CAA's purpose); see also Roy-
ster, supra note 1, at 95 (concluding that environmental regulatory authority
returns to Tribes some measure of decision-making as to uses made of their
territories).
164. See generally United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (recogniz-
ing that "Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and their territory .... [T]hey are 'a separate people'
possessing the power of regulating their internal and social relations.").
20011
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e. Checkerboard Jurisdiction
Checkerboard jurisdiction within tribal reservations derives
from the early allotment era. 165 The patchwork of tribal, state and
federal authorities co-existing within reservations often creates seri-
ous jurisdictional disputes among the several autonomous enti-
ties. 166 Past Supreme Court decisions have attempted to resolve
these disputes by exempting privately owned fee lands from tribal
jurisdiction, thus creating an intricate pattern of checkerboard reg-
ulation within reservation lands.' 67 In Montana, the Supreme Court
denied an Indian Tribe regulatory authority over non-member fish-
ing and hunting on non-member reservation fee lands. 68 In
Brendale, the Court upheld its Montana decision, finding that the
Yakima Nation lacked zoning authority over non-member fee lands
within their reservation.169
However, in Brendale, Justice Blackmun stated in his concur-
ring opinion that denying Tribes the power to make "rational and
comprehensive" environmental decisions for its reservation "would
guarantee that adjoining reservation lands would be subject to in-
165. See Royster, supra note 1, at 89-90 (documenting governmental curtail-
ment of territorial extent of Tribal sovereign powers). Checkerboard patterns re-
sult when fee lands remain subject to state or federal authority rather than tribal
authority. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1304. The era of allotment created a
patchwork of tribal trust lands, Indian allotments and non-Indian fee lands within
some reservations. See Royster, supra note 1, at 90. This checkerboard pattern of
competing authorities often creates jurisdictional disputes among Tribes, States
and the Federal Government. See id. For a further discussion of the allotment era
and the resulting curtailment of tribal regulatory authority, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
166. See Royster, supra note 1, at 90 (noting frequency of conflicts within
patchwork reservation).
167. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 540, 560 n.9 (1981) (concluding
that "[i]t defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-
Indians purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when
an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal
government."). The Supreme Court, in Montana, established a general rule deny-
ing Tribes authority to regulate non-member fee lands absent an express congres-
sional delegation unless the non-member conduct adversely affected the political,
social and economic well-being of the reservation. See id. at 563-67. The Supreme
Court subsequently upheld this ruling in Brendale, finding that tribal governments
lacked zoning authority over non-member fee lands. See generally Brendale v. Confed-
erated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
168. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (finding Tribes generally lacked regulatory
authority over non-member fee lands absent threats upon Tribes' political, eco-
nomic or social well-being).
169. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 425 (upholding Montana's general rule denying
tribal regulatory authority absent an express congressional delegation vesting
Tribes with regulatory powers).
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consistent and potentially incompatible ... policies."' 7o1 Judith Roy-
ster, in Environmental Protection and Native American Rights:
Controlling Land Use Through Environmental Regulation, supported
Justice Blackmun's observation, stating that "[t]he resultant patch-
work of governmental authority [within reservations] not only un-
dermines the territorial sovereignty of the [T] ribes, but is unwieldy
and ultimately unworkable."' 71 The Arizona Public court recognized
the inherent disabilities of checkerboard regulation and properly
found that a checkerboard pattern of regulation within reservation
boundaries is inconsistent with the purpose and provisions of the
1990 CAA Amendments. 172
2. Dissenting Opinion
Circuit Judge Ginsburg's proposal that section 7410(o) is the
true and only manifestation of an express congressional delegation
is inaccurate and incomplete. 73 Sections 7410(o) and 7601(d)
have two distinct functions. 174 It is undisputed that section 7410(o)
expressly delegates to Tribes the authority to create and submit to
170. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that plural-
ity failed to recognize significant tribal interest in regulating reservation lands).
"Such a holding would guarantee that adjoining reservation lands would be subject
to inconsistent and potentially incompatible zoning policies, and for all practical
purposes would strip Tribes of the power to protect the integrity of trust lands over
which they enjoy unquestioned and exclusive authority." Id.
171. Royster, supra note 1, at 91 (noting that "[c]heckerboard jurisdic-
tion . . .discourages long range planning, hinders comprehensive resource man-
agement, and breeds conflict and distrust."); see also Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at
1288 (observing that high mobility of air pollutants renders any checkerboard pat-
tern of regulation ineffective). The Arizona Public court observed that "[t] he high
mobility of air pollutants, resulting areawide effects and the seriousness of such
impacts, underscores the undesirability of fragmented air quality management
within reservations." Id. (quoting Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,959).
172. See Arizona Public 211 F.3d at 1288 (noting that CAA checkerboard juris-
diction is "inconsistent with the purpose and provisions of the Act.").
173. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1289 (stating that "Congress' failure to use
the same language in § 7601(d) [that it used in § 7410(o)] does not at all imply
that it meant to avoid delegation [of regulatory authority] to the Tribes"); see also
Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7255 (noting that § 7601(d) is vehicle by which TIPs,
submitted pursuant to § 7410(o) guidelines, become effective).
174. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (outlining CAA's treatment as States
provision), with 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o) (outlining elements of TIPs and process by
which Tribes submit TIPs); see also Cochran, supra note 63, at 323 (finding that
§ 7601 (d) (2) gives EPA authority to treat Tribes as States for purpose of imple-
menting CAA and reqtires EPA to promulgate regulations disclosing those provi-
sions for which it is appropriate to treat Tribes as States). "Tribal authority to
regulate environmental air quality under the plan proposed by the EPA stems from
two sources: (1) a valid federal delegation; and (2) inherent tribal authority to
regulate conduct within territory under tribaljuisdiction." Id.
2001]
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EPA a plan for implementing air quality standards.1 75 It is, how-
ever, incorrect to use the delegation set forth in section 7410(o) to
negate a similar delegation in section 7601(d) (2) (B). 176 Limiting
tribal authority under section 7601 (d) (2) (B) to lands within a
Tribe's jurisdiction not only contradicts the plain language of sec-
tion 7601 (d) (2) (B), but also renders the Tribe's regulatory power
ineffective and useless.' 77 Proscribing Tribes' authority to imple-
ment, enforce and maintain air quality standards on all reservation
lands, including non-member fee lands, contradicts tribal self-deter-
mination and creates a patchwork of varying regulations within Tri-
bal reservations.178 Thus, Ginsburg's theory regarding the absence
of the "notwithstanding" proviso is ill-conceived.1 79 To empower
Tribes to create TIPs, but simultaneously deny Tribes the general
regulatory power to implement, enforce and maintain TIPs
throughout reservation lands, runs contrary to the enunciated pur-
pose of the 1990 CAA Amendments. 180
V. IMPACT
"Pollution neither knows nor respects sovereign borders.''
Although the preservation of natural resources is the ultimate goal
of Tribes, States and EPA, jurisdictional disputes over the regula-
tion of reservation lands functionally impede the realization of
these environmental goals.1 82 Currently, the process of treating
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o) (providing that TIPs "shall become applicable to
all areas... located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation .... ).
176. See Cochran, supra note 63, at 337 (marking CAA §§ 7410(o) and
7474(c) as also containing express congressional delegations in addition to delega-
tion in § 7601 (d) (2) (B)) (emphasis added).
177. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1290 (finding § 7601 (d) (2) (B) is intention-
ally broad).
178. Royster, supra note 1, at 89 (announcing "[e]nvironmental regulatory
authority should permit Indian nations to re-instill tribal environmental goals and
values into . . . Indian Country.").
179. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1289 (holding dissent's argument that ab-
sence of "notwithstanding" proviso from § 7601(d) (2) (B) negates existence of ex-
press congressional delegation unpersuasive). "The dissent's argument resting on
Congress' omission of a 'literal delegation' is seductive, but, ultimately, also uncon-
vincing." Id. For a further discussion of the "notwithstanding" proviso, see supra
notes 111 and 115 and accompanying text.
180. For a further discussion of CAA's purpose, see supra notes 128-136 and
accompanying text.
181. Reding, supra note 31, at 188; see also Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1288
(quoting Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. At 43,959) (noting high mobility of air pollu-
tants and areawide effects of those pollutants).
182. See generally Conerton, supra note 48, at 3 (examining effects of jurisdic-
tional disputes on achieving clean air standards); see also Reding, supra note 31, at
171 (observing that Tribes and States claim vital interests in ensuring reservation
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Tribes as States creates several conflicts between state and tribal
governments. 8 3 Given the high mobility of air pollutants and the
interdependence of state and tribal jurisdiction, it is imperative for
Tribes and States to come together and work cooperatively for envi-
ronmental protection. 18 4 Tribes and States could avert jurisdic-
tional disputes by entering into cooperative agreements to jointly
administer federal environmental programs, like CAA, within reser-
vation boundaries.1 8 5 Collaborative implementation of federal en-
vironmental programs allows Tribes and States to define the
manner in which they will accomplish their environmental goals,
bringing together state and tribal resources to creatively address en-
vironmental issues. 1
86
Yet, the possibility of a tribal-state collaborative effort is daunt-
ing.1' 7 Accordingly, the Arizona Public court properly determined
that CAA section 7601 (d) constitutes an express congressional dele-
gation of authority to Tribes to regulate reservation air quality.' 88
In effect, the D.C. Circuit's holding promotes tribal self-govern-
ment and self-determination by granting Tribes greater regulatory
pollution sources are properly regulated and managed, but they differ on how to
achieve such regulation).
183. See generally Conerton, supra note 48 (noting that current treatment as
state process fosters tribal-state jurisdictional conflicts). "In view of the mobility of
environmental problems and interdependence of various jurisdictions, it is imper-
ative that all affected sovereigns work cooperatively for environmental protection,
rather than engage in confrontations over jurisdiction." Id.
184. See id. (observing that CAA goals would be better accomplished by state-
tribal collaborative effort); see also Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1288 (noting that
effective enforcement of CAA standards is best accomplished by allowing Tribes
and States to establish uniform standards within their boundaries).
185. See generally Conerton, supra note 48 (noting beneficial effects of cooper-
ative agreements). Cooperative agreements would operate to resolve state-tribal
disagreements without involving EPA. See id. "In an era where 'partnership' is the
theme between EPA and States and between EPA and Indian [T]ribes, cooperative
state/tribal programs would be one step in building stronger state-tribal-EPA part-
nerships." Id.
186. See id. (illustrating advantages of cooperative agreements such as shared
goals, problems, resources and promoting relationships beyond environmental
arena).
187. See Reding, supra note 31, at 185 (revealing that coerced concurrent juris-
diction is problematic insofar as it nullifies tribal and state sovereign efforts to
form collaborative agreements). "Such concurrent jurisdiction would provide the
means to set competing public policies and goals on a collision course should the
standards be adverse to each other." Id.
188. See Arizona Public, 211 F.3d at 1284 (holding EPA did not err in finding
§ 7601 (d) (2) (B) delegated authority to Tribes to regulate all land within reserva-
tion, including non-member owned fee lands).
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power over reservation lands.189 A contrary holding, in the spirit of
Circuit Judge Ginsburg's dissenting opinion, would limit tribal reg-
ulatory powers and frustrate Congress' intent in enacting the 1990
CAA Amendments. 190
The complex nature of air pollution regulation fosters conflict
between tribal and state authorities.19' Absent judicial rulings
resolving these conflicts, a continued checkerboard pattern of regu-
lation is likely to result. 192 Although the Arizona Public court cor-
rectly found that section 7601 (d) (2) (B) expressly delegates to
Tribes the authority to regulate all reservation lands, other courts
may rule differently upon this issue in the future. 9 3 If the courts
do not uniformly enforce EPA's Final Rule, inconsistencies mandat-
ing Supreme Court review are likely to result. 194 Without a defini-
tive court resolution delineating the scope of tribal regulatory
authority, Tribes will continue to develop air quality programs
under uncertain terms. 195 These results appear inconsistent with
the purpose and provisions of CAA. 196 Therefore, a bright line rule
defining the extent of Tribes' authority to implement, enforce and
maintain air quality standards over all lands within a Tribe's reserva-
tion is necessary to effectively enforce federal clean air standards. 97
Kristina Marie Reader
189. See Royster, supra note 1, at 96 (declaring "environmental regulatory au-
thority will . . . at least in some instances . . . return to [T] ribes some measure of
decision-making as to the uses made of their territories.").
190. For a further discussion of congressional intent, see supra notes 128-147
and accompanying text.
191. For a further discussion of jurisdictional conflicts, see supra notes 8-10
and accompanying text.
192. See Epel & Tierney, supra note 5, at 10592 (indicating that judicial deter-
minations of state and tribal primacy will likely continue to promote a checker-
board pattern of regulation despite EPA's proposed system); see also Cochran,
supra note 63, at 345 (observing that express congressional delegation is appropri-
ate basis for Tribes' regulatory authority).
193. See id. at 345 (remarking that courts may not uphold EPA's Final Rule
uniformly and noting need for some basis establishing tribal regulatory authority).
194. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7255 (observing that even though Tribes
have inherent authority over all resources within exterior boundaries of reserva-
tions, EPA should finalize delegation approach to avoid case-by-case litigation).
195. See Epel & Tierney, supra note 5, at 10592 (hypothesizing that until
courts resolve arguable conflict between EPA's proposed rule and contrary com-
mon law precedent, Tribes will be forced to exercise their authority unsure of how
far their authority extends).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (marking CAA's primary purpose as protecting
and enhancing national air quality).
197. See Epel & Tierney, supra note 5, at 10592 (stating that questions regard-
ing extent of tribal regulatory authority will undoubtedly arise until courts finalize
issues surrounding EPA's interpretation of § 7601 (d)).
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